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I.	 Introduction:	the	Crisis	of	the	Anthropocene	
One	of	the	earlier	editorial	pieces	of	 the	 Journal	of	Human	Rights	and	the	Environment	
opened	with	the	quote	of	the	American	anthropologist	Margaret	Mead	‘[w]e	won’t	have	
a	society	if	we	destroy	the	environment’.1	Unfortunately,	if	we	look	into	the	evidence	of	
biophysical	signs,	 the	threat	of	environmental	breakdown	is	eminent,2	and	humanity’s	
survival	might	 indeed	 be	 under	 threat.	 Our	 ecological	 footprint	 on	 Earth	 is	 at	 such	 a	
scale	 that	 we	 find	 ourselves	 in	 a	 geological	 epoch	 called	 the	 Anthropocene,3	
characterised	 as	 it	 is	 by	human	 terraforming	of	 the	Earth.4	 Our	biosphere	 is	 sick	 and	
behaves	like	an	infected	organism;	every	living	organism	in	the	biosphere	is	declining.	
The	 evidence	 is	 increasingly	 clear:	 in	 a	 scientific	 study	 commissioned	 by	 the	 United	
Nations	 in	 2005,	 it	 was	 reported	 that	 humans	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 extinction	 of	
50,000–55,000	species	each	year.5		
                                                
1	 K	 Morrow,	 ‘Ontological	 Vulnerability:	 A	 Viable	 Alternative	 Lens	 through	 which	 to	 View	
Human/Environmental	Relations’	(2011)	2	Journal	of	Human	Rights	and	the	Environment	1,	1.	
2	 A	 Grear,	 ‘Multi	 level	 Governance	 for	 Sustainability:	 Reflections	 from	 a	 Fractures	 Discourse’	 (2010)	 5	
Europe	Institute	Journal	73,	88.	
3	See	eg	LJ	Kotzé,	‘Rethinking	Global	Environmental	Law	and	Governance	in	the	Anthropocene’	(2014)	32	
Journal	 of	 Energy	 &	 Natural	 Resources	 Law	 121;	 LJ!Kotzé,	 ‘Human	 Rights	 and	 the	 Environment	 in	 the	
Anthropocene’	(2014)	The	Anthropocene	Review	1.		
4	 E	 Fitz-Henry,	 ‘Decolonising	 Personhood’	 in	 M	 Maloney	 and	 P	 Burdon	 (eds),	Wild	 Law	 –	 in	 Practice	
(London,	Routledge,	2014)	133–48.	
5	P	Burdon,	Earth	Jurisprudence	and	Earth	Community	(Adelaide	Law	School,	The	University	of	Adelaide,	
2011).	
  
At	 the	 core	 of	 this	 environmental	 crisis	 lies	 the	 long	 held	 belief	 that	 humans	
consider	 themselves	 to	 be	 different	 from	nature	 and	nature	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 resource	 for	
human	 use	 and	 consumption.	 From	 a	 regulatory	 perspective,	 an	 intricate	 system	 of	
property	 rights	 has	 provided	 the	 tools	 to	 appropriate	 and	 commodify	 nature	 and	
increasingly,	 nature’s	 landscapes	 and	 environments	 get	 caught	 up	 in	 market-based	
solutions.6	 This	 market-based	 and	 corporate-sponsored	 approach	 towards	 the	
protection	of	the	environment	is	rooted	in	an	anthropocentric	understanding	of	nature	
and	 is	 vehemently	 opposed	 in	 the	 more	 critical	 circles	 of	 the	 humanities	 and	 social	
sciences,	often	under	the	banner	of	the	posthuman	condition.7	
It	 is	 no	 different	 for	 law,	 which	 itself	 is	 perceived	 as	 being	 deeply	
anthropocentric	 and	 rotating	 around	 the	Anthropos	 (conceptualised	 as	 human/man),8	
and	 as	 reducing	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 life	 to	 objects.9	 The	 central	 position	 of	 the	 human	
subject	 in	 the	 juridical	 order	 as	 both	 agent	 and	 beneficiary	 has	 been	 profusely	
problematised	 in	critical	 legal	 scholarship.10	The	natural	world	has	been	reduced	 to	a	
‘subaltern’11	 object,	 a	 process	 that	 has	 characterised	 nature	 as	 an	 ‘exploited	
                                                
6	 S	 Sullivan,	 J	 Igoe	 and	 B	 Büscher,	 ‘Introducing	 “Nature	 on	 the	 Move”	 –	 A	 Triptych’	 (2013)	 6	 New	
Proposals:	Journal	of	Marxism	and	Interdisciplinary	Inquiry	15,	15.!	
7	Fitz-Henry,	‘Decolonising	Personhood’	(n	4).	Some	of	the	scholarship	on	the	posthuman	condition	Fitz-
Henry	 refers	 to	 are	 (and	 this	 list	 is	 not	 exhaustive)	 eg	 J	 Bennett,	Vibrant	Matter:	 A	 Political	 Ecology	 of	
Things	 (Durham,	NC,	Duke	University	Press,	 2010);	T	Morton,	The	Ecological	Thought	 (Cambridge,	MA,	
Harvard	University	Press,	2010)		
8	V	Plumwood,	Feminism	and	the	Mastery	of	Nature	(London,	Routledge,	1993);	C	Merchant,	The	Death	of	
Nature:	Women,	Ecology,	and	the	Scientific	Revolution	(New	York,	HarperCollins	Publishers,	1980).		
9	 A	 Grear,	 ‘Deconstructing	 Anthropos:	 A	 Critical	 Legal	 Reflection	 on	 “Anthropocentric”	 Law	 and	
Anthropocene	Humanity’	(2015)	26	Law	Critique	225.		
10	 See	 eg	 A	 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos	 (ed),	 Law	 and	 Ecology:	 New	 Environmental	 Foundations	
(Abingdon,	Routledge,	2011);	P	Burdon	(ed),	Exploring	Wild	Law:	The	Philosophy	of	Earth	 Jurisprudence	
(Kent	Town,	Wakefield	Press,	 2011);	 C	Cullinan,	Wild	 Law:	Manifesto	 for	Earth	 Justice	 (Totnes,	 Chelsea	
Green	Publishing,	2011).		
11	G	Spivak,	Death	of	a	Discipline	(New	York,	Columbia	University	Press,	2003).	
  
proletariat’.12	 As	 we	 find	 ourselves	 in	 what	 has	 been	 perceived	 as	 a	 new	 geological	
epoch,	a	human-centric	worldview	may	no	longer	be	tenable.	Life	as	we	know	it	can	no	
longer	sustain	itself	and	global	environmental	change	has	introduced	a	new	urgency	to	
critical	 legal	 thinking	 and	 demands	 that	 ‘normal’	 certainties	 are	 inverted,	 or	 even	
dissolved.13	 Extreme	weather,	 volcanic	 eruptions,	 earthquakes,	 pollution	 and	 flooding	
have	 come	 to	 symbolise	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 Gaia,	 but	 planet	 Earth	 is	 also	 materially	
affected	and	the	idea	of	some	critical	thinkers	that	we	only	have	one	Earth,14	forces	us	to	
think	about	the	ecology	of	the	Anthropocene.15		
In	 pursuit	 of	 such	 an	 endeavour,	 this	 chapter	 explores	 the	 challenges	 and	
opportunities	of	the	Anthropocene	for	environmental	law.	Through	a	closer	reading	of	
anthropology	 and	 eco-philosophy,	 a	 new	 legal	 terrain	 is	 (re)discovered	 wherein	 the	
laws	 of	 nature	 dictate	 a	 new	 contract	 between	 living	 and	 non-living	 entities	 in	 the	
universe	 as	 an	 ‘ultimate’	 attempt	 to	 save	 the	 Earth	 and	 all	 its	 living	 and	 non-living	
habitants.	 To	 this	 end,	 Part	 II	 below	 explores	 rights	 of	 nature	 from	 a	 historical	
perspective	 as	 a	 counter	 narrative	 to	 the	 commodification	 of	 nature.	 Parts	 III	 and	 IV	
discuss	the	material	and	ontological	turn	in	anthropology	respectively.	Part	V	looks	into	
representing	alterity	from	an	ontological	perspective	which	is	then	further	discussed	in	
Part	VI	where	anthropology	 is	brought	 into	 conversation	with	 law	 through	a	detailed	
reading	of	the	work	of	the	eco-philosopher	Michel	Serres.	The	final	part	of	the	chapter	
offers	 contemporary	 examples	 of	 rights	 of	 nature,	 which	 resemble	 some	 of	 the	 legal	
propositions	that	were	discussed	in	the	previous	parts.		
                                                
12	E	Fitz-Henry,	‘The	Natural	Contract:	From	Lévi-Strauss	to	the	Ecuadorian	Constitutional	Court’	(2012)	
82	Oceania	264.			
13	T	Morton,	Hyperobjects:	Philosophy	and	Ecology	after	 the	End	of	 the	World	 (Minneapolis,	Minneapolis	
University	Press,	2013).		
14	 See	 eg	 B	 Latour,	 A	 Cautious	 Prometheus:	 A	 Few	 Steps	 towards	 a	 Philosophy	 of	 Design	 (with	 Special	
Attention	to	Peter	Sloterdijk)	(Keynote	Lecture,	Networks	of	Design	meeting	of	the	Design	History	Society,	
Falmouth,	 Cornwall,	 3	 September	 2008)	 www.bruno-	 latour.fr/sites/default/files/112-DESIGN-
CORNWALL-GB.pdf.		
15	MMJ	Fischer,	 ‘The	Lightness	of	Existence	and	 the	Origami	of	 “French”	Anthropology:	Latour,	Descola,	
Viveiros	 de	 Castro,	 Maillasoux,	 and	 their	 so-called	 Ontological	 Turn’	 (2014)	 4	 HAU:	 Journal	 of	
Ethnographic	Theory	331,	336.	
  
II.	 Counter	Discourse	
As	 a	 counter	 force	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 commodification	 and	 capitalisation	 of	 nature,	
Ecuadorian	activists	have	lobbied	and	embraced	a	rights-based	approach	to	nature.16	In	
2008,	the	Ecuadorian	Constituent	Assembly	became	the	first	juridical	body	in	the	world	
to	legalise	what	Michel	Serres	called	a	 ‘natural	contract’;17	a	concept	to	which	I	return	
later	 in	 the	 chapter.	 With	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 United	 States	 based	 Community	
Environmental	 Legal	 Defense	 Fund,	 representatives	 at	 the	 Assembly	 in	 July	 of	 2008	
rewrote	their	1998	Constitution	to	include	a	landmark	series	of	provisions	delineating	
the	rights	of	nature.	While	the	world	had	to	wait	until	2008	to	witness	the	constitutional	
materialisation	 of	 rights	 of	 nature,	 the	 French	 anthropologist	 Claude	 Lévi-Strauss	
already	 lobbied	 in	 1976	 in	 the	 French	 National	 Assembly	 for	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	
‘rights	of	the	living’.18		
Lévi-Strauss’	vision	was	very	much	based	around	the	idea	that	the	centrality	of	
the	rights	of	people	that	were	being	debated	in	the	Assembly	had	to	be	dismantled	and	
displaced.19	He	argued	that	the	concept	of	rights	needed	to	encompass	all	living	species.	
For	Lévi-Strauss	it	was	clear	that	humans	had	no	right	to	wipe	out	whole	ecosystems	or	
species	without	 charges	 that	 border	 on	 genocide.	 Yet,	 several	 years	 later	we	 are	 still	
debating	the	viability	of	ecocide	as	a	potential	new	crime	in	law.20	
                                                
16	Fitz-Henry	‘The	Natural	Contract’	(n	12).	
17	M	Serres,	The	Natural	Contract,	E	MacArthur	&	W	Paulson	trans	(Ann	Arbor,	The	University	of	Michigan	
Press,	1995	[1990]).	
18	Fitz-Henry	(n	12).	A	lengthier	version	of	this	speech	at	the	National	Assembly	(1985)	can	be	found	in	
the	 concluding	chapter	of	C	Lévi-Strauss,	The	View	 from	Afar	 (Chicago,	Chicago	University	Press,	1992)	
282.	
19	Lévi-Strauss,	The	View	from	Afar	(n	18).	
20	 In	 2010,	 the	 proposal	 to	 amend	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 to	 include	 an	 international	 crime	 of	 Ecocide	was	
submitted	by	Polly	Higgins	to	the	International	Law	Commission	(ILC).	The	ILC	is	the	UN	body	‘mandated	
to	promote	 the	progressive	development	of	 international	 law	and	 its	 codification’.	The	 submission	was	
published	as	chs	5	and	6	in	P	Higgins,	Eradicating	Ecocide:	Exploring	the	Corporate	and	Political	Practices	
  
As	 an	 anthropologist	 immersed	 in	 local	 settings	 and	 other	 non-Western	
worldviews,	Lévi-Strauss	was	particularly	concerned	about	extending	rights	to	all	living	
species,	including	rocks	and	birds:	
The right to life and to the free development of the living species still represented on the earth, 
is the only rights that can be called inalienable Ð for the simple reason that the disappearance 
of any species leaves us with an irreparable void in the system of creation.21   
Lévi-Strauss	saw	his	intervention	at	the	French	National	Assembly	as	the	‘beginning	of	a	
new	declaration	of	rights’.22	One	approach	that	has	been	widely	advocated	to	embody	to	
some	extent	the	idea	of	the	rights	of	nature,	is	a	human	right	to	a	healthy	environment.23	
Doubts	are	raised	though	if	a	human	rights	framework	is	sufficient	to	raise	the	principle	
of	environmental	protection	to	a	higher	level	of	ecological	sustainability	that	recognises	
human	obligations	towards	ecosystems	and	the	environment	as	a	foundational	principle	
or	 Grundnorm	 of	 legal,	 political	 and	 social	 systems.24	 In	 the	 present	 worldview,	 the	
biosphere	 has	 no	 legal	 standing	 within	 human	 rights	 law	 and	 a	 non-negotiable	
ecological	 bottom	 line	 fails	 to	 materialise	 in	 what	 is	 essentially	 and	 to	 its	 core	 an	
anthropocentric	human	rights	regime.25	The	issue	of	climate	change	has	been	trying	to	
call	us	to	attention	and	to	move	us	into	action,	but	as	Anna	Grear	observes:	
While we wrestle with epistemological quandaries and doubts concerning the best state of our 
knowledge and debate the best way forward, we are faced with a planetary crisis. The 
                                                                                                                                                  
Destroying	 the	 Planet	 and	 Proposing	 the	 Laws	 to	 Eradicate	 Ecocide	 (London,	 Shepheard-Walwyn	
(Publishers)	Ltd,	2010).		
21	Lévi-Strauss	(n	19)	at	284.	
22	ibid,	284.	
23	A	turning	point	for	the	relationship	between	human	rights	and	environmental	concerns	came	in	1972	
with	the	introduction	of	a	distinct	human	right	to	a	healthy	environment	formulated	first	in	Principle	1	of	
the	 1972	 Stockholm	 Declaration:	 ‘[m]an	 has	 the	 fundamental	 right	 to	 freedom,	 equality	 and	 adequate	
condition	of	 life,	 in	an	environment	of	a	quality	that	permits	a	 life	of	dignity,	well-being,	and	he	bears	a	
solemn	responsibility	to	protect	and	improve	the	environment	for	present	and	future	generations’.	
24	 K	 Bosselmann,	 ‘Environmental	 and	Human	Rights	 in	 Ethical	 Context’	 in	 A	 Grear	 and	 LJ	 Kotzé	 (eds),	
Research	Handbook	on	Human	Rights	and	the	Environment	(Cheltenham,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2015).		
25	Bosselmann,	‘Environmental	and	Human	Rights	in	Ethical	Context’	(n	24).	
  
evidence is mounting: a multitude of material and bio-physical signs point to the threat of 
impending environmental breakdown.26 
According	 to	 Grear,	 responding	 to	 planetary	 ontic	 limits	 seems	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	
human	 rights	 language,	 despite	 its	 wider	 and	 powerful	 achievements:	 ‘[t]he	
anthropocentric	 limitations	 of	 the	 Western	 human	 rights	 tradition	 reinforces	
anthropocentrism	as	a	form	of	grave	ecological	blindness’.27	In	practice,	this	means	that	
environmental	 law	needs	to	step	up	and	provide	adequate	protection	mechanisms	for	
preserving	 nature	 and	 ecosystems.	 Unfortunately,	 environmental	 law	 has	 often	 been	
developed	without	 taking	 into	 account	 the	wider	 ethical	 context.28	What	 is	 important	
within	the	context	of	the	urgency	of	the	Anthropocene	is	to	embrace	and	think	through	
the	possibilities	that	could	be	developed	if	environmental	law	were	to	shift	its	focus	to	
establish	a	more	ethical	and	sustainable	relationship	between	human	cultures	and	non-
human	 ‘others’.29	 For	 present	 purposes,	 this	 means	 that	 environmental	 law	 should,	
among	 others,	 seek	 inspiration	 from	 other	 disciplinary	 theoretical	 debates	 about	 the	
relationship	between	culture	and	nature,	by	specifically	reflecting	upon	the	encounter	
between	 humans	 and	 non-humans	 and	 how	 this	 encounter	 has	 been	 theorised	 in	
anthropology	 and	 (environmental)	 continental	 philosophy	 and	 apply	 some	 of	 the	
thinking	in	these	other	disciplines	to	environmental	law.			
III.	 Materiality		
A	dialogue	needs	to	be	established	amongst	different	cultures	how	we	–	as	a	collective	
of	 human	 species	 –	 engage	with	 the	 environment.	 The	most	 compelling	 discourse	 on	
this	 matter	 resides	 in	 indigenous	 peoples’	 cultures	 and	 their	 worldviews,30	 a	
proposition	 that	 I	 will	 return	 to	 later.	 The	 cultural	 and	 legal	 milieu	 of	 indigenous	
                                                
26	A	Grear,	 ‘Multi	Level	Governance	 for	Sustainability:	Reflections	 from	a	Fractures	Discourse’	 (2010)	5	
Europe	Institute	Journal	73,	88.	
27	Grear,	‘Multi	level	Governance	for	Sustainability’	(n	26)	at	88	
28	Bosselmann	(n	24).	
29	A	Pelizzon,	‘Earth	Laws,	Rights	of	Nature	and	Legal	Pluralism’	in	M	Maloney	and	P	Burdon	(eds),	Wild	
Law	–	in	Practice	(London,	Routledge,	2014).	
30	Pelizzon,	‘Earth	Laws’	(n	29)	at	177.		
  
peoples’	being	and	worldviews	can	provide	novel	cognitive	insights	into	the	materiality	
of	the	current	environmental	crisis	and	can	become	the	conduit	for	taking	the	question	
of	materiality	 to	 environmental	 law.	 A	 renewed	 focus	 on	 the	material	 world	 offers	 a	
fresh	look	at	what	it	means	to	be	human	and	its	relationship	with	the	non-human	world.	
The	material	world	has	for	a	long	time	been	the	central	focus	of	actor-network	theories	
in	 science	 and	 technology.	 Socio-cultural	 and	 philosophical	 anthropology	 have	 also	
experienced	what	has	been	labelled	an	ontological	turn,	with	a	renewed	interest	in	the	
meaning	of	 the	material	world.	Explained	 in	more	detail	 later,	 the	 turn	 to	ontology	 in	
anthropology	is	mainly	associated	with	the	work	of	Philippe	Descola,	Eduardo	Viveiros	
de	 Castro	 and	Bruno	 Latour.31	 Their	 scholarship	 has	mainly	 been	 in	 reaction	 to	 their	
belief	 that	 the	 broad	 humanist	 linguistic	 turn	 in	 socio-cultural	 anthropology	 is	 ill-
equipped	 to	 grapple	 with	 and	 confront	 the	 environmental	 and	 socio-ecological	
problems	in	the	Anthropocene.	What	defines	the	Anthropocene	is	the	entanglement	of	
human	 and	 non-human	 conditions	 and	 futures,	 raising	 ethical	 and	 political	 questions	
that	can	no	longer	be	treated	as	exclusively	human	problems.32				
Kohn	 defines	 ontological	 anthropology	 as	 ‘a	 non-reductive	 ethnographic	
exploration	 of	 realities’	 that	 is	 not	 socially	 constructed.	 The	 ontological	 turn	 in	
anthropology	 is	 in	 response	 to	 current	 ecological,	 existential,	 ethical	 and	 political	
problems.33	 These	problems	 force	 us	 to	 think	 about	 human	 life	 in	 a	world	where	 the	
future	of	the	human	being	is	in	danger.	Consequently	we	also	need	to	consider	the	kind	
of	 life	 and	 future	 that	 is	 beyond	 the	 human	 being,	 as	 it	 were.34	 The	 ontological	 turn	
follows	on	from	a	previous	correlational	turn	in	philosophy	which,	according	to	Quentin	
                                                
31	E	Kohn,	‘Anthropology	of	Ontologies’	(2015)	44	The	Annual	Review	of	Anthropology	311.	
32	ibid.		
33	ibid,	315.	
34	ibid.	
  
Meillassoux,	has	limited	philosophy	to	the	study	of	human	thought	and	kept	philosophy	
away	from	studying	the	‘great	outdoors’;	the	world	beyond	human	representation.35	
In	 the	 troubling	 times	 of	 the	 Anthropocene,	 however,	 Latour36	 calls	 us	 to	
attention	 when	 he	 compares	 the	 apocalyptic	 collapse	 of	 Gaia37	 to	 the	 apocalyptic	
futurism	of	the	Paraguyan	Ayereo.38	Gaia	is	perceived	as	the	immunological	reaction	of	
the	Earth;39	for	Latour,	Gaia	has	the	power	to	summon	us	in	the	same	way	as	gods	used	
to	 do.	As	 the	Earth	 is	 placed	 in	 a	 ‘state	 of	 exception’40,	 it	 demands	 everyone	 to	make	
decisions	 about	 life	 and	 death	 until	 a	 new	 political	 body	 emerges.	 Describing	 the	
condition	 of	 Gaia	 as	 a	 ‘feverish	 form	 of	 palsy’,41	 usefully	 summarises	 the	 need	 to	
acknowledge	 that	 the	 world	 is	 not	 just	 made	 up	 of	 signifying	 or	 discursive	 realities;	
there	is	something	deeply	material	about	the	world.42	Having	been	greatly	entangled	in	
discourses,	or	what	Levi	Bryant	describes	as	the	‘diacritical	differences	of	the	signifier’,	
‘the	 real	 physical	 efficacy	 of	 fossil	 fuels,	 pollutants	 and	 automobiles’43	 has	 been	
overlooked.	 For	 too	 long,	 we	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 text	 instead	 of	 material	 factors;	
materiality	 has	 been	 lost	 and	 embedded	 in	 a	 socially	 constructed	 understanding	 of	
                                                
35	 Q	 Meillassoux,	 After	 Finitude:	 An	 Essay	 on	 the	 Necessity	 of	 Contingency,	 R	 Brassier	 trans	 (London,	
Bloomsbury,	 2012);	 G	 Harman,	 Quentin	 Meillassoux:	 Philosophy	 in	 the	 Making	 (Edinburgh,	 Edinburgh	
University	Press,	2015).		
36	B	Latour,	An	Inquiry	into	Modes	of	Existence:	An	Anthropology	of	the	Modern	(Cambridge	MA,	Harvard	
University	Press,	2013)	quoted	in	Fischer,	‘The	Lightness	of	Existence’	(n	15).	
37	 Gaia	 is	 one	 of	 the	 Greek	 primordial	 goddesses	 and	 the	 ancestral	 mother	 of	 all	 life.	 Gaia	 is	 also	 an	
ecological	term	coined	by	James	Lovelock	in	1979.	As	a	theory	Gaia	denotes	that	the	Earth	itself	is	viewed	
as	a	living	organism	with	self-regulatory	capacities	and	functions.		
38	Fischer	(n	15)	at	336.	
39	ibid,	336.		
40	C	Schmitt,	Political	Theology	 (Chicago,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005	[1922])	quoted	in	Fischer	(n	
15).	
41	B	Latour,	Facing	Gaia:	Six	Lectures	on	the	Political	Theology	of	Nature	(The	Gifford	Lectures,	University	
of	 Edinburgh,	 18–28	 February	 2013)	 www.bruno-latour.fr/node/487;	 bruno-
latour.fr/sites/default/files/downloads/GIFFORD-SIX-LECTURES_1.pdf,	quoted	in	Fischer	(n	15)	at	80.		
42	Fischer	(n	15).		
43	 L	 Bryant,	 Onto-Cartography:	 An	 Ontology	 of	 Machines	 and	 Media	 (Edinburgh,	 Edinburgh	 University	
Press,	2014)	ix.			
  
cultural	practices.	As	Bryant	warns,	reducing	materialism	to	something	that	is	cultural	
and	 discursive	 is	 not	 without	 analytical	 and	 political	 consequences.	 First,	 it	 makes	
physical	agencies	 invisible;	 the	power	of	 ‘things’	or	 reality	 is	 reduced	 to	an	economic,	
linguistic	or	cultural	 representation.	Acknowledging	 that	 reality	can	produce	an	effect	
beyond	 being	 a	 conduit	 for	 social	 relations	 has	 been	 labelled,	 at	 best,	 as	 a	 naïve	
approach.44	 Secondly,	 it	 has	 obscured	 our	 thinking	 and	 has	 paralysed	 our	 political	
actions	 to	 address	 climate	 change,	 among	 others:	 ‘[t]hinking	 climate	 change	 requires	
thinking	 ecologically	 and	 thinking	 ecologically	 requires	 us	 to	 think	 how	we	 are	 both	
embedded	 in	 a	 broader	 natural	 world	 and	 how	 non-human	 things	 have	 power	 and	
efficacy	 of	 their	 own’.45	 Climate	 change	 forces	 us	 to	 think	 beyond	 symbolic	
representation	since	we	are	facing	encounters	with	real	materiality,	with	physicality.	To	
this	end	it	seems	that	a	new	vogue	of	an	ontological	turn	is	calling	upon	us.46	
	
IV.	 Ontological	Turn	in	Anthropology	
Given	 that	 the	entangled	 relationship	between	humans	and	non-humans	 is	one	of	 the	
most	 defining	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Anthropocene	 (Donna	 Haraway	 speaks	 of	 the	
Chthulucene),47	 anthropology	may	be	 the	discipline	par	excellence	 that	 can	 inspire	us	
how	 to	 study	 this	 relationship	 with	 non-humans,	 or	 the	 ‘Other’.48	 In	 anthropology,	
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thinking	 through	 and	 about	 difference	 is	 not	 done	 through	 our	 own	 (often	Western)	
worldviews	and	perceptions;	 the	other	world	(human	and	non-human)	 is	experienced	
through	 the	 concepts	 and	 queries	 as	 understood	 by	 the	 ‘Other’.49	 The	 great	 divide	
between	nature	and	culture	is	not	only	questioned,	but	also	transcended.	To	be	sure,	the	
recent	 ontological	 turn	 in	 anthropology	 has	 reinforced	 the	 importance	 of	 studying	
alterity.50		
With	 this	 ontological	 paradigm	 shift,	 the	 question	 is	 no	 longer	 about	
understanding	different	cultures,	or	how	people	think	about	nature.	As	Kohn	manages	
to	 capture	 eloquently	 in	 the	 title	 of	 his	 book,	 it	 is	 rather	 about	 understanding	 ‘how	
forests	 think’.51	 Human	 exceptionism	 is	 questioned	 and	 a	 posthuman	 anthropology	 is	
proposed	in	which	a	multispecies	ethnography	is	pursued,	exploring	the	perspectives	of	
non-human	life	forms	and	non-life	forms.52	The	postcolonial	question	that	Spivak	asked	
a	few	decades	ago:	‘[c]an	the	Subaltern	speak’,53	is	now	extended	to	‘[c]an	the	mosquito	
think’,54	or	‘[d]o	glaciers	listen?’.55	
Christopher	 Stone	 asked	 a	 related	 question	 in	 1972	 when	 he	 questioned	 in	
Should	Trees	Have	Standing,56	if	natural	objects	such	as	lakes	and	forests,	could	get	the	
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status	 of	 legal	 persons.57	 But	 while	 an	 anthropological	 understanding	 transcends	 the	
distinction	 between	 nature	 and	 culture	 or	 human	 and	 tree,	 law	 seems	 to	 limit	 legal	
personality	to	human	species	as	the	natural	is	placed	outside	the	border	of	personality.	
Properly	reflecting	on	the	limits	of	law,	this	means	that	despite	Stone’s	efforts	to	argue	
the	opposite,	nature	and	the	environment	remain	property,	and	not	persons,	or	at	least	
rights-bearing	entities	for	the	purpose	of	law.58		
This	is	where	multispecies	ethnographies	have	an	advantage	as	they	can	provide	
a	conceptual	and	methodological	toolkit	 to	de-centre	traditional	approaches	to	human	
agency	 and	 politics;	 the	 centrality	 and	 hegemonic	 position	 of	 the	 Anthropos	 is	
challenged	and	human	and	non-human	relationships	can	be	represented	through	other	
(non-human)	perspectives.59	As	Kohn	writes,	 ‘[t]his	 reach	beyond	 the	human	changes	
our	understanding	of	foundational	analytical	concepts	such	as	contexts	but	also	others,	
such	as	representation,	 relation,	 self,	ends,	difference,	 similarity,	 life,	 the	real,	mind’.60	
With	the	ontological	turn,	socio-cultural	anthropology	has	managed	to	move	on	from	its	
humanistic	 and	 linguistic	 background	 steeped	 in	 social	 construction.	 This	 puts	
ontological	 anthropology	 in	 a	 privileged	 position	 to	 conceptualise	 an	 epoch	
characterised	 by	 entanglements	 of	 human	 and	 non-human	 worlds	 and	 futures.61	
Ontological	 anthropology	 provides	 insights	 into	 how	 to	 study	 and	 acknowledge	 a	
multiplicity	of	actual	worlds.62	A	 (somewhat	disparate)	collective	of	avant-garde	post-
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humanist	thinkers63	passionately	expose,	once	and	for	all,	the	irrelevance	of	the	culture–
nature	divide;	the	outmoded	Western	cosmological	binary	is	transcended	with	euphoric	
contemporary	entanglements.64		
The	 twentieth-century	 epistemological	 turn	 is	 now	 succeeded	 with	 a	 new	
ontological	 turn	 that	 addresses	 both	 perspectivism	 (through	 Descola’s	 anthropology	
rooted	 in	 ethnology	 and	 Amazonian	 ethnography),	 and	 technology	 (through	 Latour’s	
Science	 and	 Technology	 Studies	 and	 technographic	 development	 of	 French	
philosophers	 of	 emergence).65	 Descola’s	 and	 Latour’s	 theoretical	 endeavours	 (often	
labelled	as	philosophical	anthropology)	are	in	close	dialogue	with	Viveiros	de	Castro.66	
Each	of	 these	 three	 theoretical	 framing	–	 ‘foundational	perspectivism’,	 ‘beyond	nature	
and	culture’	and	‘modes	of	existence’	–	will	be	discussed	further	below.	
	
A. Foundational ÔPerspectivismÕ 
When	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 anthropologist	 Eduardo	 Viveiros	 de	 Castro67	 was	
translated,	 the	 term	 ontology	 was	 introduced	 in	 the	 Anglo-Saxon	 anthropological	
canon.68	Doyens	 in	anthropology	such	as	Marilyn	Strathern,69	Bruno	Latour70	and	Roy	
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Wagner,71	clearly	left	their	mark	in	Viveiro	de	Castro’s	work	who	advocated	for	a	special	
kind	of	perspectivist	cosmology	of	predation,	cannibalism	and	reincarnation	as	a	way	to	
critique	the	distinction	between	nature	and	culture.72	This	type	of	cosmology	is	typical	
for	Lowland	Amazonia	and	inverts	the	Western	or	modern	model	of	nature	and	culture:	
nature	becomes	the	variable	and	culture	is	constant.73		
Based	 on	 the	 many	 ethnographic	 observations	 and	 reflections	 in	 Amazonia,	
Viveiros	 de	 Castro	 develops	 an	 indigenous	 theory	 according	 to	which,	 in	 very	 simple	
terms,	the	European	claim	that	jaguars	are	not	people	is	overturned	because	jaguars	are	
people	with	their	own	communities	and	shamans.	In	essence,	Amazonian	perspectivism	
shows	 an	 alternative	 viewpoint	 of	 human	 and	 non-human	 entanglements.74	 Animals	
and	people	see	themselves	as	people;	the	form	of	species	is	just	merely	a	clothing	or	an	
‘envelope’	hiding	an	 internal	human	 form.75	Usually	only	 trans-specific	beings	such	as	
shamans,	 can	 see	 the	 internal	 form	 or	 spirit	 of	 the	 animal,76	 but	 in	 general	 terms	
animals	 are:	 ‘an	 intentionality	 or	 subjectivity	 formally	 identical	 to	 human	
consciousness,	 materialisable,	 […],	 in	 a	 human	 bodily	 schema	 concealed	 behind	 an	
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animal	 mask’.77	 Perspectivism	 offers	 law	 another	 view	 on	 personhood	 which	 is	 no	
longer	 an	 ‘absolute,	 diacritical	 property’	 of	 some	 (elitist	 and	 chosen)	 species,	 but	 to	
occupy	a	point	of	view	or	to	have	personhood	depends	on	the	context	and	is	a	question	
of	 degree.	 In	 some	 Amazonian	 contexts,	 animals	 may	 have	 more	 agency	 than	 some	
humans	and	are	therefore	perceived	to	have	the	characteristics	of	a	human	rather	than	
an	animal.	This	does	not	mean	that	non-human	personhood	is	a	given	fact;	whether	or	
not	 a	 specific	 species	 can	 be	 a	 prosopomorphic	 agent	 capable	 of	 affecting	 humans	 is	
always	 open-ended,	 dependent	 as	 it	 is	 on	 context	 and	 personal	 experience.78	 The	
context	 though	 is	 defined	 in	 Amerindian	 terms	 and	 cannot	 be	 imported	 ready-made	
from	our	own	perspective.79	 The	 relevance	of	perspectivism	 for	 environmental	 law	 is	
that	it	offers	the	opportunity	to	go	beyond	an	anthropocentric	understanding	of	law	as	
perspectivism	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 nature	 and	 culture	 is	 a	
Western	point	of	view	not	shared	in	other	worldviews,	such	as	the	Amazonian	ones.		
	
B. Beyond Nature and Culture 
Although	the	translation	of	the	work	of	Viveiros	de	Castro	has	raised	the	awareness	of	
an	ontological	turn	in	anthropology,	Descola	and	his	suspension	of	the	category	‘nature’	
as	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 anthropological	 enquiry	 about	 difference,	 provided	 the	 initial	
groundwork	 for	an	ontological	 turn.80	 Lévi-Strauss’	work,! focusing	on	native	 thoughts	
and	worldviews	as	having	merit	in	their	own	right,!has	influenced	Descola	and	others.	
His	 legacy	 is	even	more	radical	when	he	argues	 that	when	anthropologists	attempt	 to	
think	through	the	thoughts	of	the	‘Others’,	ontological	properties	of	the	universe	can	be	
revealed.81	 Descola	 shares	 with	 Lévi-Strauss	 ‘an	 emphasis	 on	 broad	 ethnological	
comparison	and	 the	 formalist	 insistence	 that	 the	apparently	 infinitely	diverse	ways	 in	
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which	 people	 live	 in	 relation	 to	 others	 are	 the	 product	 of	 more	 finite	 ways	 of	
apprehending	and	constructing	these	relations’.82	According	to	Descola,	this	means	one	
can	only	understand	others,	human	or	non-human,	through	self-comparison.	In	practice	
this	entails	that	there	is	only	a	certain	form	of	ontological	assumptions	possible.	If	the	
‘Other’	is	understood	in	comparison	to	oneself,	the	‘Other’	can	be	categorised	according	
to	 their	similar	or	dissimilar	 interiorities	and	dissimilar	or	similar	exteriorities.83	This	
leads	 to	 a	 categorisation	 of	 four	 possible	worldviews,	 namely	 ‘animism’,	 ‘naturalism’,	
‘totemism’	and	‘analogism’.		
Having	similar	interiorities	and	dissimilar	exteriorities,	is	labelled	by	Descola	as	
animism,	which	is	perceived	as	an	ideal	type	and	can	be	found	among	many	indigenous	
peoples	 in	 the	 Amazon	 and	 the	 boreal	 regions	 of	 North	 America.	 For	 the	 animist	 all	
beings	 are	 persons	 as	 their	 selfhood	 is	 comparable	with	 that	 of	 human	 persons,	 and	
beings	are	differentiated	by	their	exteriority.	For	example,	for	an	animist,	a	shaman	can	
become	 a	 jaguar	 when	 wearing	 canine	 teeth	 or	 other	 markers	 that	 make	 jaguars	
distinctive	predatory	beings.	It	is	a	psychic	continuity	that	permits	a	movement	across	
physical	discontinuities.84	Modern	westerners	distinguish	 themselves	as	naturalists	 as	
they	assume	dissimilar	interiorities	and	similar	externalities.	What	marks	the	difference	
is	 a	 unique	 interior.	 Nature	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 ‘object’	 that	 is	 external	 to	 our	 subjective	
selves.85	 Totemism	 assumes	 that	 others	 have	 similar	 interiorities	 and	 similar	
exteriorities,	 and	 can	 be	 found	 amongst	 certain	 aboriginal	 societies	 in	 Australia.	
Distinctions	between	interiority	and	exteriority	are	broken	down;	what	is	important	is	
the	 perception	 that	 humans	 and	 non-humans	 share	 the	 same	 world.	 The	 fourth	
worldview	 is	 labelled	analogism,	which	 is	characterised	by	dissimilar	 interiorities	and	
dissimilar	 exteriorities	 and	 historically	 was	 widely	 distributed	 in	 the	 Americas,	 Asia,	
Africa	and	Europe.	Analogists	distinguish	themselves	by	creating	local	groupings	among	
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entities	that	do	not	seem	to	have	a	relation	with	each	other	 in	a	quest	 to	create	order	
out	of	chaos.		
Descola’s	 categorisation	has	been	criticised	 in	anthropology,86	 but	what	 can	be	
distilled	 from	 his	 work	 is	 an	 awareness	 and	 acceptance	 that	 other,	 non-Western	
metaphysics	exist	and	need	to	be	recognised	at	the	very	least.	Descola’s	work	can	help	
law	to	 think	beyond	the	 impermeable	boundary	and	distinction	 that	has	been	created	
between	 nature	 and	 culture.	 He	 dismantles	 not	 only	 the	 binary	 thinking	 around	 the	
headings	of	 nature	 and	 culture,	 but	 his	work	 also	 allows	 a	deeper	 rejection	of	 binary	
thinking	between	universal	and	particular,	objective	and	subjective,	physical	and	social,	
fact	and	value,	immanence	and	transcendence,	body	and	mind,	animality	and	humanity,	
and	 many	 more.87	 All	 these	 binaries	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 law	 for	 creating	
boundaries	and	for	excluding	some	humans	and	non-humans	from	the	law.		
	
C. Modes of Existence 
Latour,	 in	 his	 writings	 on	 the	 Anthropocene,	 has	 potentially	 offered	 the	most	 salient	
contribution	to	the	ontological	turn	for	law.88	Latour	forcefully	argues	that	despite	the	
Anthropocene	putting	humans	 centre	 stage	 and	 conceiving	 them	as	 a	 force	of	 nature,	
anthropology	 can	no	 longer	be	 just	 about	humans.	Drawing	upon	his	 earlier	work	on	
actor	 network	 theory	 (ANT),	 Latour	 argues	 that	while	 ANT	 can	 contribute	 in	making	
humans	 and	 non-human	 part	 of	 the	 same	 analytical	 framework,	 in	 order	 to	 value	
nature,	 other	 non-human	 voices	 should	 also	 be	 recognised.	 In	 other	 words,	 Latour	
pleads	for	the	acceptance	of	‘other	modes	of	existence’	or	ontologies.		
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Latour	 is	 particularly	 known	 for	 bringing	 nature	 into	 culture	 and	 culture	 into	
nature.	His	work	has	often	been	labelled	as	being	part	of	the	broad	ontological	turn,	as	it	
is	 linked	to	ANT	and	therefore	perceived	as	a	 form	of	symmetrical	anthropology.	This	
means	that	we	are	dealing	with	a	flat	ontology	which	refuses	to	give	priority	to	any	one	
actor.	 The	 world	 consists	 of	 many	 different	 actors	 and	 agencies	 and	 none	 is	 more	
important	 than	 the	 other.	 ANT	 overcomes	 the	 mind–body	 dualism	 by	 assuming	 that	
everything	is	like	minded,	both	in	agency	as	matter.89		
Studying	 encounters	 between	 humans	 and	 non-humans	 in	 science	 and	
technology	studies,	Latour	has	‘discovered’	a	sense	of	material	worlds	and	social	actions	
between	 humans	 and	 non-humans.	 According	 to	 Latour,	 any	 kind	 of	 knowledge,	
including	 legal	knowledge,	 is	not	 just	abstract	knowledge	but	 is	always	part	of	society	
and	 its	 social	 fabrications	 and	 also	 has	 a	 material	 aspect.90	 Latour	 highlights	 the	
materiality	of	law	through	its	engagement	with	space,	archives,	databases	and	forensic	
models.91	 For	 the	purpose	 of	 law,	 the	 question	 remains:	 can	 law’s	materiality	 also	 be	
extended	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 materiality	 such	 as	 pollution,	 flooding,	 earthquakes	 and	
climate	change?	
	
V.	 Knowledge	and	Experience	in	the	Anthropocene		
The	ontological	turn	described	above	is	not	without	its	critics,92	but	instead	of	engaging	
with	some	of	 these	critiques	–	valuable	as	 they	may	be	–	 it	 is	more	useful	 for	present	
purposes	to	distil	the	main	points	that	unite	the	ontologists	and	then	to	use	these	as	a	
starting	 point	 for	 the	 wider	 dialogue	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	
anthropology.	 Anthropology,	maybe	more	 than	 any	 other	 discipline,	must	 accept	 and	
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confront	the	crisis	that	the	concept	of	the	Anthropocene	is	bringing	on.	As	a	discipline,	it	
has	to	face	the	challenge	that	the	Anthropos	can	no	longer	be	the	central	focal	point	(a	
point	that	has	been	made	by	Anna	Grear)93	and	has	been	replaced	by	ideas	such	as	the	
post-subjective,	 the	 posthuman	 and	 the	 post-plural.94	 Anthropocentric	 thinking	 is	 no	
longer	 fashionable,	 so	out	of	 the	Anthropos’	 ashes	 something	new	has	 to	 emerge.	The	
attack	on	 the	Anthropos	 is	 a	 symbol	 of	 a	wider	 critique	 against	 epistemology	 and	 the	
way	 knowledge	 is	 represented.	 The	 linguistic	 turn	 of	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 has	 been	
criticised	 because	 culture	 is	 seen	 as	 ‘a	 realm	 of	 discourse,	 meaning	 and	 value	 [...]	
conceived	to	hover	over	the	material	world	but	not	to	permeate	it’.95	To	counter	cultural	
relativism,	 ontologists	 emphasise	 alterity	 (otherness)	 and	 radical	 difference,	 and	
distinguish	themselves	from	earlier	attempts	to	treat	difference	as	a	function	of	diverse	
ways	of	knowing	and	representing	reality.96	Instead,	they	accept	and	promote	a	variety	
of	‘truths’	about	being	and	how	the	world	is	made.	Embracing	these	other	ways	of	being	
is	not	only	perceived	as	a	means	to	rescue	anthropology	in	a	posthuman	world,	but	it	is	
also	thought	that	the	ontological	turn	could	come	to	the	rescue	of	the	planet	and	its	life	
forms.97	To	summarise,	as	the	cosmos	is	in	a	desperate	state,	the	Anthropos	needs	to	be	
rethought	and	the	ontological	turn	in	anthropology	offers	the	scope	to	think	beyond	the	
human,	and	revive	a	radical	alterity.	This	is	not	just	a	task	for	anthropology,	but	also	for	
law,	which	will	have	to	think	and	act	upon	its	own	need	for	an	ontological	turn	(see	the	
discussion	further	below).		
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The	ontological	turn	must	be	interpreted	as	a	clear	reaction	to	the	linguistic	turn	
in	 anthropology	 and	 has	 been	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 turn	 in	 philosophy.	 The	 linguistic,	
representational,	or	what	Quentin	Meillassoux98	has	labelled	‘correlational	turn’	is	often	
associated	with	the	work	of	Immanuel	Kant,	who	shifted	the	focus	from	substance	of	the	
world	to	‘those	conditions	under	which	the	humans	know	or	represent	the	world’.99	The	
reality	 of	 phenomena	 is	 socially	 constructed	 and	 is	 the	 product	 of	 ‘contingent,	 and	
conventional	 contexts,	 be	 they	 historical,	 social,	 cultural	 or	 linguistic.	 The	 circular,	
reciprocal,	 coconstitutive	 nature	 of	 these	 constructions	 makes	 them	 language-like,	
regardless	of	whether	 the	 items	related	are	explicitly	 treated	as	 linguistic’.100	 In	other	
words,	 the	 ontological	 turn	 also	 seeks	 to	 create	 an	 alternative	 understanding	 of	
language	 and	 semiology.	 Human	 language	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 sign,	 which	 in	 the	
Saussurean	tradition101	is	treated	simultaneously	as	having	no	direct	connection	to	the	
object	 it	 represents	 and	 the	meaning	of	 the	 sign	 is	 also	pre-fixed	by	 ‘a	 set	 of	 codified	
relations	it	has	to	other	such	signs	in	the	system	of	signs’.102	The	Saussurean	approach	
towards	 language	distinguishes	between	the	signs	and	the	world	to	which	these	signs	
refer	to	without	giving	any	thought	how	these	gaps	can	be	connected.	In	sum,	language	
in	 the	 Saussurean	 tradition	 has	 created	 a	 dualism	 between	 representation	 and	 the	
actual	 world.	 However,	 if	 human	 reality	 is	 represented	 as	 language	 and	 social	
construction,	we	are	confronted	with	the	difficulty	to	conceptualise	and	represent	‘that	
which	is	outside	of	language	or	culture’.103	What	the	ontological	turn	in	anthropology	is	
ultimately	 challenging	 is	 ‘to	 reconfigure	 [its]	 relationship	 to	 language	 [and]	 the	
ethnographic	study	of	how	humans	communicate	with	a	host	of	nonhuman	beings	in	a	
world	that	is	itself	communicative	but	not	symbolic	or	linguistic’.104		
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Particularly,	 the	work	 of	 the	 anthropologist	 Eduardo	Kohn	 in	 the	 rainforest	 of	
Ecuador’s	Upper	Amazon	could	provide	us	with	insights	into	a	series	of	different	forms	
of	communication	that	are	representational	but	not	language-like.105	Kohn	draws	upon	
the	work	of	the	philosopher	Charles	Peirce106	who,	contrary	to	Saussure,	has	focused	on	
the	 representation	 of	 what	 lies	 beyond	 the	 human,	 or	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Peirce,	 ‘the	
outward	 clash’.107	 By	 focusing	 on	 the	 communicative	 processes	 between	 humans	 and	
non-humans	 outside	 the	 framework	 of	 language	 offers	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	 the	
relationship	between	the	human	and	the	non-human	in	a	post-humanist	world.	Shifting	
the	focus	on	the	relationship	between	language	and	non-language	representations	has	
given	 anthropology	 the	 tools	 to	 ecologise.108	 It	 has	 allowed	 for	 anthropology	 to	 show	
that	 focusing	 on	 language	 and	 its	 properties	 as	 ways	 to	 represent	 the	 world	 has	
troubled	 our	 understanding	 of	 difference,	 context	 and	 commensurability,	 or	 the	
relationality	between	humans	and	non-humans	tout	court.		
Encounters	with	other	kinds	of	being	make	us	aware	 that	seeing,	 representing,	
and	 perhaps	 even	 knowing	 and	 thinking,	 are	 not	 exclusively	 human	 affairs.	
Representation	 is	 thus	more	 than	 just	 linguistic	 and	 symbolic;	 representation	 can	 go	
beyond	 language	 and,	 by	 extension,	 beyond	 the	 human.	 Non-human	 life	 forms	 can	
equally	 represent	 the	 world.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 us	 humans,	 this	 concept	 is	 difficult	 to	
comprehend,	as	social	theory	has	a	very	long	history	of	conflating	representation	with	
language.109	 A	poignant	 issue	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	ontological	 turn	 in	 anthropology	
for	 (environmental)	 law	 is	 then	 to	 ponder	 how	 the	 world	 beyond	 language	 can	 be	
accessed	and	represented	in	law.		
VI.	 Law	in	the	Anthropocene	
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By	 way	 of	 summary,	 the	 ontological	 turn	 in	 social	 and	 cultural	 theory	 shows	 that	
language	plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 representation	 and	 realisation	of	 knowledge;	 but	
critically,	 it	 also	 obscures	 the	 world	 and	 prevents	 direct	 access	 to	 experience.	 This	
occurs	against	the	backdrop	of	the	Anthropocene,	which	calls	for	a	renewed	interest	in	
how	 bodies	 sense	 environments	 and	 events,	 including	 ‘activities	 which	 cannot	 be	
captured	with	words	but	have	a	material	existence	on	and	beyond	the	boundaries	with	
language	and	knowledge’.110			
Critical	 environmental	 law	 may	 be	 particularly	 receptive	 to	 an	 ontological	
turn.111	Environmental	law	has	been	for	too	long	dislodged	from	reality;	a	reality	which	
is	 currently	 vividly	 explicated	 by	 the	 Anthropocene.	 As	 is	 widely	 accepted,	
(environmental)	 law	 is	 deeply	 entwined	 with	 anthropocentrism	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	
treats	nature	as	objects.	Although	more	recently	nature,	and	particularly	animals,	may	
be	 treated	as	 legal	subjects,	 this	subjectivity	or	 legal	personhood	 is	still	very	different	
from	that	of	humans	and	it	is	language	that	plays	a	crucial	role	in	this	distinction.112	The	
language	 in	 which	 environmental	 law	 has	 to	 express	 itself	 or	 communicate	 its	
intentionality	needs	a	radical	shift.	A	promising	start	has	been	made	within	the	wider	
debate	 of	 critical	 environmental	 law.	 Andreas	 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos	 has	
proposed	 useful	 interventions,	 which	 resonate	 with	 my	 suggestions	 for	 a	 legal	
ontological	turn.	As	he	argues:	
[T]he task of a critical environmental law is to work along its connection with ecology, indeed 
within this open ecology of disciplinary and ontological fluidity, and construct a new language 
in order to communicate about this new home. The challenge is multiple, not least because 
this language can no longer be ÔjustÕ a language but rather a performance of wholehearted 
embracing of materiality. It is not coincidental that environmental law is the most readily 
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available means to drag law outside its linguistic ivory tower and land it on the material, the 
social, the corporeal, the gendered, the spatial, the animal, the molecular.113  
Acknowledging	 that	 environmental	 law	 is	 self-destructive	 as	 it	 exudes	 considerable	
violence	 against	 the	 environment	 (often	 expressed	 through	 its	 anthropocentric	
character),	 one	 of	 the	main	 interpolations	 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos	 proposes	 for	
environmental	 law	is	 to	de-individualise	the	 individual	and	to	de-centre	the	human	in	
an	 ecological	 field	 that	 goes	 beyond	 an	 anthropocentric	 and	 ecocentric	 dualism.	 He	
draws	 upon	 critical	 autopoeitic	 theory	 to	 rescue	 environmental	 law	 from	 its	 own	
paradox(es).	He	brings	Luhman’s	theory	of	autopoeitic	systems	into	conversation	with	
post-ecological	 and	 posthuman	 understandings	 of	 law	 drawing	 upon,	 among	 others,	
Deleuzian	and	feminist	thoughts,	but	also	includes	some	reflections	about	new	material	
and	 object-oriented	 ontologies.	 Whilst	 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos	 engages	 with	
Luhmann’s	autopoeitic	theory,114	I	am	particularly	interested	in	the	ontological	turn	in	
anthropology	to	create	a	better	understanding	about	the	role	alternative	semantics	may	
play	in	bringing	back	materiality	into	the	law.	As	Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos	argues,	
the	non-recognition	or	exclusion	of	various	non-human	and	non-linguistic	positions	in	
(environmental)	 law	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 citizens	 and	 non-
citizens,	 humans	 and	 subalterns,	 and	 the	 natural	 and	 artificial.115	 Ultimately,	 the	
rejection	of	posthuman	and	non-linguistic	positions	has	a	major	 impact	upon	 law	and	
lawmaking	 and	 leads	 to	 instances	 of	 injustice	 and	 environmental	 destruction.	 So	 far,	
(critical)	 environmental	 law	 has	 not	 reflected	 how	 anthropology	 and	 its	 interest	 in	
biosemiotics116	or	non-human	 linguistic	signs	can	help	 in	developing	a	more	 inclusive	
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form	 of	 environmental	 law	 that	 can	 regulate	 in	 a	 more	 ethical	 way	 the	 relationship	
between	humans	and	non-humans.		
What	defines	the	Anthropocene	is	not	so	much	the	centrality	of	the	Anthropos	in	
creating	 a	 new	 epoch	 but,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Latour,	 what	 makes	 the	 Anthropocene	
distinctive	is	that	‘[t]he	Earth	has	become	–	has	become	again!	–	an	active	local,	limited,	
sensitive,	fragile,	quaking,	and	easily	tickles	envelope’.117	Typical	for	Latour,	this	raises	
the	 issue	 what	 kind	 of	 agency	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 this	 new	 Earth.	 The	 question	 of	
agency	 takes	us	 to	 the	core	of	a	classical	 legal	distinction	between	subject	and	object.	
Whilst	previously	the	Earth	was	a	subject	dictating	its	natural	laws	to	humankind,	in	the	
Anthropocene	 the	 Earth	 has	 been	 reduced	 to	 an	 object;	 it	 is	 trembling	 and	 shaking	
because	 of	 human	 interventions.	 Humans	 are	 no	 longer	 left	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 the	
trembling	 of	 the	 Earth,	 as	 we	 are	 now	 responsible	 for	 disturbing	 its	 autonomy.118	
Ultimately	what	defines	the	Anthropocene	is	that	both	Earth	and	humans	have	lost	their	
status	as	subject,	both	have	become	objects	and	are	forced	together	in	their	loss	of	being	
able	 to	 act	 autonomously;	 they	 are	 both	doomed	 to	 share	 agency	with	 other	 subjects	
that	have	 lost	their	 freedom	to	act.	This	also	means	that	what	previously	was	deemed	
impossible	 in	 the	ontology	of	science	 to	be	both	subject	and	object,	 the	Anthropocene	
has	blurred	the	boundaries	between	subjects	and	objects.119		
As	a	consequence,	dreams	of	human	mastery	over	Earth	have	to	be	abandoned;	a	
proposition	that	has	repercussions	 for	 law	and	how	law	treats	nature.	The	urgency	of	
the	Anthropocene	no	longer	allows	us	to	reduce	nature	and	the	Earth	to	our	object;	to	
share	agency	with	the	Earth	means	that	we	may	have	to	question	the	presumption	that	
we	 humans	 occupy	 an	 exceptional	 position	 in	 law	 because	 of	 our	 linguistic	 freedom.	
This	is	where	the	conversation	between	anthropology	and	law	may	contribute	to	a	new	
understanding	 that	 humans	 no	 longer	 occupy	 a	 special	 place	 in	 law	 based	 on	 their	
linguistic	skills.	As	Hoffmeyer	argues:	
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The needs of all living beings for expressing a degree of anticipatory capacity is seen as an 
evolutionary lever for the development of species with increased semiotic freedom. Human 
intentionality is not therefore unique in the world but must be understood as a peculiar and 
highly sophisticated instantiation of a general semiotics of nature. Biosemiotics offers a way 
to explicate intentionality naturalistically.120  
As	 the	 Anthropocene	 is	 the	 epoch	 that	 subverts	 and	mixes	 objects	 and	 subjects,	 the	
meaning	 of	 the	world	 is	 no	 longer	 just	 an	 expression	 of	 language.	 The	Anthropocene	
requires	an	ontological	proposition	to	semiotics.	The	world,	the	Earth,	the	cosmos	and	
the	 universe	 need	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 themselves	 and	 are	 not	 only	 a	 feature	 of	
representation	 through	 the	 language	 about	 the	world,	 the	 Earth,	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	
universe.	 They	 have	 meaning	 in	 their	 own	 sense;	 existence	 and	 meaning	 are	
synonymous	 and	 as	 long	 as	 all	 agents	 act,	 they	 have	 agency.	 Law,	 just	 like	 any	 other	
system,	has	 captured,	 translated	and	morphed	agency	 into	 speech.	Yet,	 as	Amazonian	
examples	of	 communicative	 encounters	have	 shown	 so	 aptly,121	 not	 everything	 in	 the	
world	is	a	matter	of	discourse	in	the	sense	of	a	speech	act.	The	possibility	of	discourse	
resides	 in	 every	 agent	 looking	 for	 its	 existence.	 As	 the	 Anthropocene	 shows	 us	 so	
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dramatically,	storytelling	is	no	longer	the	prerogative	of	human	language;	being	thrown	
in	the	world	is	by	itself	already	a	story	that	is	fully	articulated	and	active.122		
The	 French	 eco-philosopher	 Michel	 Serres,	 whose	 work	 is	 dedicated	 ‘to	 (re)-
connect	the	modern	subject	to	the	universe	and	to	(re-)discover	his	or	her	small	place	in	
the	 larger	 biotic	 community	 of	 life’,123	 provides	 insights	 in	 how	 to	 capture	 the	
materiality	of	the	human	condition,	and	shows	the	opportunity	that	can	be	created	for	
law	when	the	distinction	between	objects	and	subjects	is	blurred.	Serres	explores	‘what	
it	means	for	a	sentient	being	to	be	tossed	into	the	chaos	of	existence	with	other	particles	
of	matter	 in	a	complex,	 interdependent,	and	 interconnected	cosmic	network’.124	 In	his	
book,	The	Five	Senses:	A	Philosophy	of	Mingled	Bodies,125	Serres	returns	to	the	role	of	the	
body	which	expresses	 ‘the	primary	materiality	of	the	human	condition,	through	which	
we	 feel,	 touch,	 taste	 and	 see	 the	world’.126	 Serres	 is	 critical	 of	 traditional	 empiricism	
since	 he	 believes	 it	 shades	 the	 senses	 and	 may	 have	 influenced	 how	 we	 have	
conceptualised	 knowledge.127	 Through	 the	 rich	 world	 of	 sense,	 experience	 can	 be	
produced	and	knowledge	can	no	longer	be	reduced	to	individual	bodies	or	language.128	
Senses	allow	getting	closer	to	the	experience	of	the	everyday	life,	something	that	cannot	
be	 achieved	 through	 language	 as	 the	 latter	 can	 only	 mediate	 knowledge	 and	 cannot	
provide	direct	access	to	experience.129	In	the	poetic	words	of	Serres:	
Since the beginning of our history, the global and the local world Ð from the glory of the 
heavens down to its smallest details and folds, furrows, marshy places and small pebbles Ð has 
slumbered beneath the waters of language, inaccessible and swallowed up like the great 
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cathedral. No-one could go to the object without passing through it, just as no-one gathers 
seaweed, without, in some unimaginable space, getting his arm wet.130  
Serres’	 oeuvre	 shows	 that	 the	 origin	 of	 language	 lies	 in	 the	 rhythms	 and	 calls	 of	 the	
natural	 world.131	 Through	 a	 deeply	 poetic	 engagement,	 he	 manages	 to	 capture	 the	
fragility	and	beauty	of	the	Earth.132	Serres’	attempts	to	rethink	the	relationship	between	
humanity	and	the	rest	of	the	universe	through	expressing	the	ontological	principles	that	
govern	the	universe	and	the	existence	of	all	living	and	non-living	creatures	is	poignant,	
especially	 now	 that	 the	 Earth	 is	 facing	 one	 of	 its	 most	 epic	 challenges.	 Serres’	
biosemiotics	also	 challenge	 and	 shape	our	understanding	of	 the	 existence	of	 the	non-
human	world.133	 The	 field	of	 biosemiotics	 shows	 that	 signification134	 is	 not	 limited	 to	
the	 human	 (of	 which	 Kohn’s	 examples	 of	 Amazonian	 semiotic	 interactions	 between	
humans	 and	 non-humans	 are	 representative	 examples).	 Serres’	 narrative	 of	 the	
universe	 ‘affords	 a	way	 to	 revitalize	 the	 hitherto	 anthropocentric	 notion	 of	 narrative	
identity	 at	 a	 moment	 when	 solutions	 to	 the	 most	 important	 global	 questions	 must	
increasingly	 surpass	 the	 bounds	 of	 narrowly	 human	 and	 cultural	 worlds’.135	 In	 the	
Anthropocene,	 a	 desire	 awakens	 to	 understand	 the	 relationality	 through	 which	
individuals	 and	 bodies	 are	 produced;	 focus	 shifts	 from	 the	meaning	 of	 words	 to	 the	
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material	 existence	 of	 bodies.	 Bodies	 signify	 not	 only	 the	 material	 existence	 beyond	
language,	 but	 also	 encompass	 the	 relations	 and	 intricate	 networks	 between	multiple	
material	forms	in	the	world.136	Inspired	by	the	theoretical	underpinnings	of	the	science	
and	technology	movement,	Serres	seeks	to	re-empiricise	social	and	cultural	theory,	but	
his	 turn	 to	 bodies	 and	 senses	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 return	 to	 a	
phenomenological	embodied	experience,	as	these	are	still	limited	to	a	signification	and	
representation	 in	which	 language	 plays	 a	 dominant	 force.	 In	 essence,	 senses	must	 be	
freed	from	this	meaning.		
As	argued	throughout	this	chapter,	the	first	step	towards	an	ontological	turn	in	
(environmental)	law	is	to	experiment	how	to	understand	the	non-human	world.	Crucial	
in	this	endeavour	is	for	law	to	find	a	way	to	go	beyond	the	old	dichotomous	thinking	of	
nature	 versus	 culture.	 After	 all,	 it	 is	 such	 Cartesian	 thinking	 that	 has	 been	 held	
accountable	 for	 the	 current	 socio-ecological	 crisis.	 While	 Amazonian	 encounters	
between	 humans	 and	 non-humans	 may	 provide	 insights	 on	 how	 to	 achieve	
conversations	 between	 humans	 and	 non-humans,	 they	 are	 context	 specific	 and	
therefore	will	not	travel	easily	to	a	Western	context.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	dialogue	
that	was	set	up	in	this	chapter	between	anthropology	and	law	has	been	fruitless.	On	the	
contrary,	 it	offered	us	a	platform	from	which	to	start	 thinking	that	human	language	 is	
not	 the	 only	 way	 to	 represent	 the	 world.	 This	 means	 that	 law	 is	 not	 just	 language;	
nature	 dictates	 laws	 through	 its	 natural	 processes.	 Biosemiosis	may	 be	 precisely	 the	
tool	that	could	(re)-acquaint	the	discourse	of	law	with	its	materiality.	As	environmental	
law	deals	with	pollution,	climate	change,	flooding,	drought	and	ecological	disasters,	it	is	
automatically	 exposed	 to	 its	 own	 materiality;	 environmental	 law	 has	 a	 material	
presence.137	Therefore	law	not	only	needs	to	deal	with	the	continuum	between	humans	
and	non-humans,	 it	also	needs	 to	 find	 its	own	materiality;	or	 to	put	 it	differently,	 law	
needs	to	claim	its	own	sensory	presence.138			
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This	is	where	Serres’	narratology	may	become	a	useful	‘instrument’	to	challenge	
and	shape	the	way	law	understands	the	non-human	world	and	the	relationship	between	
humans	and	non-humans.	Serres	has	developed	what	he	calls	a	Grand	Récit	(the	Great	
Story)	of	the	universe	as	a	way	to	develop	a	new	non-anthropocentric	humanism.139	For	
Serres,	 humanity	 derives	 its	 identity	 from	 its	 place	 in	 the	 universal	 narrative	 of	 the	
Great	Story,	and	not	from	any	biological	or	psychological	specificity	that	highlights	the	
difference	between	humans	and	non-humans.	Next,	Serres	pulls	the	human	further	into	
the	story	that	it	shares	with	the	rest	of	the	universe.	Serres	identifies	four	moments	in	
the	Great	Story	that	 leads	to	the	existence	of	human	beings,	but	what	is	remarkable	is	
that	 Serres	 tells	 the	 story	 through	 an	 inversed	 ordering,	 where	 each	 event	 is	 more	
ancient	than	the	last.	The	first	event	takes	us	back	millions	of	years	when	homo	sapiens	
emerged	on	the	planet.	The	second	event	is	the	emergence	of	life	on	Earth,		
from the first RNA (ribonucleic acid) with the capability to duplicate itself, through the three 
billion of years when bacteria were the dominant life-form, to the explosion of multi-cellular 
organisms recorded in the Burgess shale and the huge proliferation of orders, families, genera 
and species.140  
The	third	event	travels	back	from	biology	to	astrophysics	and	the	formation	of	material	
bodies	or	matter	in	a	young	universe	that	was	still	expanding	and	cooling.	The	last	and	
most	distant	event	is	‘the	birth	of	the	universe	itself,	the	origins	of	the	origins’.141	What	
is	 the	relevance	of	 these	stories	 in	 terms	of	discrediting	 the	nature-culture	divide	and	
what	can	it	tell	us	about	the	role	of	law	in	the	Anthropocene?			
Serres	answers	the	first	part	of	this	question	during	an	interview	in	the	Cahier	de	
l’Herne,	when	he	argues	that	understanding	humanity	in	the	context	of	the	Great	Story,	
allows	us	 to	get	a	new	sense	of	culture	 that	can	be	 traced	back	not	only	 to	Greek	and	
Mesopotamian	 civilisations,	 but	 in	 fact	 15	 billion	 years	 ago.	 The	 Great	 Story	 also	
highlights	that	the	universe	can	‘write’	its	own	story	through	its	physical	presence	and	
the	rhythms	of	 its	natural	processes.	The	story	of	 the	universe	 is	much	older	than	the	
act	of	writing,	which	was	discovered	some	4000	years	ago.	Critics	or	sceptics	may	argue	
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that	no	matter	how	far	you	go	back	with	the	story,	it	still	needs	to	be	told	by	humans	for	
humans,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 which	 the	 non-human	 simply	 gets	 ventriloquised.	 Serres,	
however,	argues	that	this	is	incorrect	because	nature	is	recounted	by	nature;	for	Serres	
semiotics	 is	 natural	 as	 all	 life	 –	 and	 beyond	 –	 receives,	 processes,	 stores	 and	 emits	
information;	there	is	no	ontological	difference	between	crystals,	plants,	animals	and	the	
order	of	the	world.	The	world	does	not	need	to	wait	for	the	arrival	of	the	human	to	tell	
its	 story;	 things	 can	 ‘write	 autobiographically’.142	 For	 the	 logic	 of	 Serres’	 argument	 to	
work,	 the	 story	 of	 the	 rhythms	 and	 events	 of	 nature	 are	 not	 modelled	 on	 a	 human	
syntactic	 prose.	 Human	 storytelling	 is	 just	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 much	 broader	
phenomenon.	 For	 Serres,	 writing	 human	 stories	 is	 a	 metonym	 of	 the	 story	 like	 the	
world:	‘I	write	like	the	light,	like	a	crystal	or	like	a	stream’.143						
The	eco-narratives	of	Serres	should	not	be	perceived	as	metaphorical	extensions	
of	 human	 storytelling.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 embody	 a	 move	 from	 metaphor	 to	
metonymy.	Human	storytelling	should	not	be	used	as	a	yardstick	against	which	all	other	
narratives	 are	measured.	 For	 Serres,	 eco-narratives	 point	 out	 that	 narratives	 are	 not	
just	for	humans;	nature	seizes	our	claim	of	using	language	as	an	exclusivity	to	represent	
the	 world.	 This	 means	 that	 a	 narrative	 identity	 extends	 well	 beyond	 the	 Anthropos.	
Serres’	 Great	 Story	 also	 offers	 us	 valuable	 insights	 into	 the	 role	 of	 law	 and	 the	
institutional	 model	 that	 can	 govern	 in	 the	 Anthropocene.	 Even	 though	 the	
Anthropocene	originated	as	a	geological	epoch	of	a	new	Earth	period,	it	is	above	all	an	
ethical	and	normative	concept;	 it	 is	an	epoch	that	demands	a	new	form	of	governance	
and	law.144	
In	 his	 seminal	 work,	 le	 Contrat	 Naturel,145	 Serres,	 inspired	 by	 Jean-Jacques	
Rousseau’s	social	contract,	argues	that	the	only	way	to	save	the	planet	and	by	extension	
our	 own	 species,	 requires	 a	 paradigm	 shift	 that	 ultimately	 redefines	 the	 relationship	
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between	human	beings	and	the	rest	of	the	universe.	In	his	distinctive	style,	Serres	holds	
humans	accountable	for	waging	a	war	against	the	planet	with	an	arsenal	of	homocentric	
logic,	 scientific	discoveries	 and	 technological	 advances.	One	of	 the	ethical	 imperatives	
that	Serres	develops	is	the	parasite,146	a	trope	he	uses	to	remind	us	that	‘a	parasite	with	
an	 insatiable	appetite	 for	 consumption	 inevitably	destroys	 its	host,	 thereby	preparing	
its	own	disappearance’.147	Serres	refers	to	another	trope	of	mastery	to	prompt	us	that	
we	 should	 stop	 ‘attempting	 to	 master	 every	 last	 material	 particle	 for	 the	 exclusive	
benefit	 of	 humanity’.148	 Instead,	 Serres	 proposes	 that	 we	 develop	 a	 partnership	 –	 a	
natural	 contract	 –	with	 the	 universe	 as	 a	way	 to	 emphasise	 that	 as	 a	 species	we	 are	
interdependent.149		
Serres	argues	that	at	the	basis	of	our	civilisation	lies	the	social	contract	that	we	
humans	signed	as	a	 collective,	 and	 that	allowed	us	 to	 leave	 the	state	of	nature	before	
there	was	a	state.150	As	Hobbes	argued,	humans	are	poor	creatures	and	‘life	of	man’	in	
its	natural	state	was	 ‘solitary,	poor,	nasty,	brutish,	and	short’.151	 In	 the	state	of	nature	
everyone	was	 at	war	with	 everyone	and	 in	 the	quest	 for	 the	 good	 life	 and	 for	 fear	of	
dying,	 humanity	 formed	 the	 state	 and	 signed	 a	 contract	 to	 protect	 its	 own	 self-
interest.152	 The	 social	 contract	 had	 far-reaching	 implications	 for	 the	 relationship	
between	 humans	 and	 nature	 as	we	 placed	 ourselves	 at	 the	 centre,	 as	 the	masters	 of	
nature.	 In	 his	 own	 typical	 style,	 Serres	 uses	 stories	 and	 examples	 of	 pollution,	
possession,	dirt	and	mastery	as	powerful	 tropes	 to	make	 the	point	 that	humanity	has	
placed	itself	at	the	centre	of	all	things:		
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LetÕs have lunch together: when the salad bowl is passed, all one of us has to spit in it and itÕs 
all his, since no one else will want any more if it. He will have polluted that domain and we 
will consider dirty that which, being clean only to him he now owns. No one else ventures 
again into the places devastated by whoever occupies them in this way. [É] A living species, 
ours, is succeeding in excluding all the others from its niche, which is now global: how could 
other species eat or live in that which we cover with filth? If the soiled world is in danger, itÕs 
the result of our exclusive appropriation of things.153  
The	contract	we	signed	that	allowed	us	to	leave	the	state	of	nature	to	form	society	was	
silent	about	the	natural	world;	the	pact	that	was	signed	neglected	nature.154	Natural	law	
as	 perceived	 by	 the	 Enlightenment	 philosophers,	 was	 the	 law	 of	 reason	 and	 reason	
governs	 everyone;	 natural	 law	was	 universal	 and	 followed	 human	nature,	which	was	
reduced	 to	either	 reason	or	history.155	The	natural	 law	of	 reason	nullified	 the	natural	
law	of	nature.156	Human	reason	conquered	nature	through	a	system	of	property	rights;	
nature	was	 possessed	 and	 pronounced	 as	 an	 object	 of	 the	 law.	 Initially	 only	 civilised	
men	 could	 be	 legal	 subjects,	 but	 progressively	 the	 definition	 of	 legal	 subjects	 has	
broadened	and	over	time,	women,	indigenous	peoples	and	other	poor	and	marginalised	
groups	 were	 given	 the	 status	 of	 legal	 subject.	 The	 social	 contract	 became	more	 of	 a	
completed	project,	but	nature	that	gave	us	food,	shelter,	heat	and	water	never	became	a	
legal	subject.	In	the	Anthropocene,	nature	writes	back	and	(re)claims	its	legal	status	as	
subject.	As	humans	have	abused	nature,	nature	threatens	or	has	already	taken	away	our	
food,	shelter,	heat	and	water.		
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Descartes’	philosophy	of	bifurcation	(nature	versus	culture)	has	left	us	now	with	
the	 choice	 of	 either	 death	 or	 symbiosis.	With	 a	 relentless	 passion,	 Serres	 urges	 us	 to	
master	our	mastery.157	If	our	mastery	is	left	unregulated,	we	will	turn	against	ourselves:	
former parasites have to become symbionts; the excesses they committed against their hosts 
puts the parasites in mortal danger, for dead hosts can no longer feed or house them. When the 
epidemic ends, even the microbes disappear, for lack of carriers for their proliferation.158     
The	only	way	 that	we	 can	prevent	 from	destroying	 the	Earth	 –	 and	ourselves	 –	 is	 by	
signing	 a	 contract	 with	 nature.159	 Law	 is	 the	 institution	 that	 can	 limit	 a	 one-sided	
parasitic	action.160	In	order	to	(re)-discover	the	Earth	we	have	to	taste,	touch,	feel,	smell	
and	 hear	 a	 cosmos	 to	 which	 everything	 is	 linked.161	 For	 the	 universe	 as	 our	 host	 to	
become	our	symbiont,	we	need	to	be	in	tune	again	with	the	world,	the	worldly	and	the	
physical.	 We	 need	 to	 go	 back	 to	 nature.162	 But	 Serres	 poses	 the	 questions:	 ‘[w]hat	
language	do	the	things	of	the	world	speak,	that	we	might	come	to	an	understanding	with	
them,	 contractually?’163	 The	 answer	 lies	 in	 the	 way	 Earth	 speaks	 to	 us,	 ‘in	 terms	 of	
forces,	bonds,	and	interactions,	and	that’s	enough	to	make	a	contract’.164		
If	nature	is	a	subject	and	no	longer	an	object,	it	can	sign	a	legal	contract,	and	the	
language	of	the	contract	is	scripted	in	the	rhythms	of	nature,	the	Earth.	Serres	gives	the	
example	of	the	floods	of	the	Nile	as	a	sign	or	rhythm	of	property	law:	
EGYPTÕS WAY. The first laws on Earth. Given normal weather, the NileÕs floods submerged 
the borders of tillable fields in the alluvial valley fertilized by the great river. At the return of 
low water, royal officials called harpedonaptai, who were surveyors or geometers, measured 
anew the land mixed with mud and silt to redistribute or attribute its parts. Life got going 
again. Everyone went home to get back to work.165 
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Flood	 thus	 influences	 laws	 of	 property.	 Floods	 take	 away	 previous	measurements	 of	
parcels;	‘it	takes	the	world	back	to	disorder,	to	primal	chaos,	to	time	zero,	right	back	to	
nature’.166	Laws	of	nature	make	decisions	and	divide	the	fields,	and	while	the	legislator	
may	dictate	and	apply	 the	 law,	 the	origins	 lie	 in	 the	 force	and	rhythms	of	nature.	The	
birth	of	law	lies	in	nature;	the	redistribution	is	in	the	hands	of	the	harpedonaptai	who	
give	birth	to	a	new	law	that	uses	the	technology	of	geometry	to	divide	the	land.167		
	
VII.	Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 attempted	 to	 establish	 a	 dialogue	 with	 those	 disciplines	 that	 have	
embraced	more	fully	than	law	has	managed	to	do,	the	continuum	between	culture	and	
nature,	 and	 consequently	 a	 return	 to	 the	 material	 world.	 A	 closer	 reading	 of	 the	
ontological	turn	in	anthropology	and	a	conversation	with	the	eco-philosophy	of	Serres	
has	shown	us	the	need	to	urgently	return	to	the	laws	of	nature,	albeit	in	a	very	different	
way	than	classical	natural	law,	which	considers	nature	our	host	and	not	our	symbiont.	
	
The	Anthropocene	and	its	material	expression	of	climate	change,	environmental	
destruction	and	loss	of	biodiversity,	 to	name	a	few,	have	made	nature	and	the	Earth	a	
legal	 subject	again.	Nature	 is	no	 longer	 just	material	 for	appropriation.	While	 law	has	
tried	to	limit	the	abusive	parasitism	of	human	beings	through	social	contracts,	the	same	
action	 of	 a	 contractual	 obligation	 to	 curb	 parasitism	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 applied	 to	 the	
relationship	between	nature	and	humans.	The	sustained	reason	that	has	been	used	to	
justify	 politics	 and	 law	 as	 exclusive	 human	 activities	 still	 rests	 on	 the	 uniqueness	 of	
human	 language.	 The	missing	 capacity	 for	 language	 imposes	 an	 objectivity	 to	 nature	
and	deprives	nature	of	any	legal	subjectivity.	As	nature	lacks	language,	it	cannot	reason	
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order	through	speech	as	a	substitute	for	violence,	and	nature	thus	remains	in	a	state	of	
violence	and	excluded	from	political	and	legal	life.		
This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 there	 are	 other	 ways	 of	 signification	 than	 just	
through	 language.	 Nature	 has	 its	 own	 way	 of	 complicated	 and	 unique	 ways	 of	
signification.	Accepting	non-linguistic	 representations	as	 a	 form	of	 signifying	practice,	
opens	 up	 new	 possibilities	 for	 extending	 sovereignty	 beyond	 the	 state	 and	 the	
relationship	 with	 the	 human.	 As	 argued	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 Anthropocene	 is	
characterised	 by	 the	 blurring	 of	 boundaries	 between	 humans	 and	 non-humans,	 and	
between	legal	subjects	and	objects.	The	Anthropocene	forces	us	to	think	more	along	the	
lines	 of	 a	 continuum,	 but	 this	 also	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty.	
Sovereignty	is	no	longer	a	political	or	legal	concept	that	can	only	be	attributed	through	
language	or	human	species.	As	Youatt	shows:	
if we consider what sovereignty looks like from the perspective of other animals, we see that 
they encounter human polities on their own semiotic terms Ð a wolf-pack cannot recognise a 
nation-state as sovereign in a formal or declarative way, but it can recognise human markers 
of territoriality, make judgments about insiders and outsiders, and assess threats to its way of 
life on which it acts. ÉThe politics of sovereignty takes place not only in human language, 
but also in other registers, involving semiotic markers of bodily gesture, visual and 
pheromonal signals, and complex forms of vocalisations.168  
All	 this	 amounts	 to	 recognising	 that	non-human	 life	 can	be	 a	 legal	 subject,	 and	
around	 the	 world	 examples	 are	 emerging	 of	 explicitly	 granting	 rights	 for	 nature.	
Ecuador’s	Constitution	is	the	most	well-known	example	that	acknowledges	respect	for	
the	 existence	 of	 Pacha	 Mama	 and	 providing	 it	 a	 right	 to	 restoration.169	 Bolivia	
recognises	that	nature	has	the	right	to	continue	its	ecosystem	processes	without	human	
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alteration	 and	protected	 from	pollution.170	 In	New	Zealand,	 the	Whanganui	River	 has	
been	granted	legal	personhood.171	Despite	the	sense	that	we	should	celebrate	that	rights	
of	nature	are	being	recognised	in	constitutions	and	statutes,	we	also	need	to	recognise	
with	 caution	 that	 the	 way	 nature	 has	 been	 brought	 into	 these	 legal	 framings	 is	 not	
without	its	own	flaws.	What	made	nature	appear	in	the	Ecuadorian	Constitution,	is	not	
the	 recognition	 of	 nature	 as	 a	 political	 actor	 per	 se,	 but	 it	 involved	 a	 decade-long	
struggle	between	Chevron	and	indigenous	peoples	over	environmental	damage	caused	
by	oil	spills.172	It	seems	that	for	all	their	progressiveness,	the	above	examples	all	suggest	
that	the	inclusion	of	non-human	life	forms	in	political	and	legal	institutions	still	require	
human	 speech	 acts.	 The	 danger	 is	 that	 these	 so-called	 broad-minded	 forms	 of	
recognising	rights	of	nature	continue	to	reproduce	anthropocentrism.		
According	 to	Latour,	 Serres’	pacific	project	of	 a	 contract	 among	parties	may	be	
inappropriate	 as	 the	 Anthropocene	 suggests	 that	 war	 may	 be	 more	 likely	 and	
imminent.173	 This	 suggests	 that	 we	 may	 have	 been	 too	 late	 with	 a	 natural	 contract.	
Ideals	of	deep	ecology	may	have	 inspired	Serres	when	he	wrote	The	Natural	Contract	
and	we	may	have	to	wonder	to	what	extent	deep	ecology	as	a	concept	can	still	save	the	
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planet.	For	Latour,	we	have	entered	another	time	where	we	need	to	think	of	protecting	
ourselves	against	one	another	and	the	revenge	of	Gaia.	This	may	require	a	different	legal	
code	than	civil	law	in	the	form	of	a	contract;	Latour	even	suggests	that	a	penal	code	may	
be	more	 appropriate.	 To	 be	 sure:	 ‘[i]n	 Serres’	 time	we	 could	 still	 dream	 of	making	 a	
natural	 contract	 with	 nature,	 but	 Gaia	 is	 another	 subject	 altogether-	 maybe	 also	 a	
different	sovereign’.174		
If	 Gaia	 has	 sovereign	 power,	 the	 Anthropocene	 also	 opens	 up	 the	 debate	 of	
environmental	 constitutionalism	 and	 legality,	 wherein	 states,	 international	 and	
domestic	law,	all	have	a	duty	to	protect	Gaia.	When	the	Inter-American	Court	of	Human	
Rights	 ruled	 in	 2012	 in	 the	 case	Sarayaka	 v	 Ecuador	 that	 the	 state	 had	 an	 obligation	
towards	the	protection	of	indigenous	dignity	and	rights,	these	rights	were	clearly	linked	
to	a	right	to	property.175	This	ruling	gives	little	hope	that	nature	will	ever	become	a	legal	
subject;	once	more	nature	has	been	reduced	to	an	object.	Reading	the	court’s	ruling	is	a	
sombre	 experience	 in	 that	 respect.	 The	 law	 of	 the	 forest	was	 not	 represented	 in	 the	
court	case,	 let	alone	being	recognised.	Other	ways	of	representing	communication	and	
non-linguistic	 signification	 has	 clearly	 not	 yet	 entered	 the	 legal	 domain.	 Yet,	 a	 closer	
conversation	between	law	and	anthropology	may	inject	a	much-needed	understanding	
about	 what	 indigenous	 peoples’	 worldviews	 and	 ontologies	 may	 actually	 mean,	
including	an	appreciation	of	a	wider	implication	that	 law	may	turn	its	attention	to	the	
importance	of	biosemiotics	when	studying	the	meaning	and	role	of	(environmental)	law	
in	the	Anthropocene.		
! !
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